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Abstract
This article argues that there are many questions that lawyers might ask, and con-
versations that they might have, about smart contracts; that some questions that are 
asked are more important than others; and that there are some questions that are not 
asked but which should be asked. First, it is argued that the question that preoccupies 
‘coherentists’ (concerning the application of the law of contract to smart contracts, 
and the fit between smart contracts and the paradigmatic ‘fiat contracts’ that are rec-
ognised by the law of contract) is neither as puzzling nor as important as might be 
supposed. Secondly, it is argued that, if there are concerns about the acceptability of 
smart contracts, then the conversation that needs to be had is of a ‘regulatory-instru-
mentalist’ nature; in particular, if the question is one of public policy restrictions on 
the use of smart contracts, then the appropriate balance of interests needs to be made 
by an institution that has both the necessary mandate and the appropriate mind-set. 
Thirdly, it is argued that there are conversations that we currently do not have but 
which urgently need to be had. Blockchain is a potentially transformative technology 
and it is important to have more fundamental conversations about the kind of com-
munity that we want to be.
Keywords Contract law · Blockchain · Smart contracts · Coherentism · Regulatory-
instrumentalism · Technological management
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1 Introduction
Not all aspects of ‘Fintech’—understood in a broad and inclusive way as referring to 
financial technologies—occasion puzzlement. For example, there is not much mys-
tery about automated teller machines (ATMs). However, some of the more recent 
developments in Fintech are genuinely puzzling. As Adam Greenfield says, ‘Almost 
all verbal conversations involving the blockchain begin and end the same way…: in 
perplexity’.1 Similarly, almost all discussions about smart contract applications gen-
erate more questions than answers. Lawyers are not sure about the technology or its 
utility, and technologists are not sure about the law.
For lawyers, much of the perplexity about blockchain(s) stems from the lack of a 
clear fit between existing regulation and either cryptocurrencies or smart contracts.2 
As to the former, these currencies seem like ‘funny money’, neither fiat coinage that 
is backed by the state but nor merely virtual assets of the kind that games players 
acquire; and, as to the latter, these transactions seem like ‘funny contracts’, being 
neither, as it were, fiat contracts (recognised by the law of contract and underwritten 
by the possibility of legal enforcement) nor transactions that are clearly outwith the 
law of contract. To this extent, the perplexity lies in our having to navigate uncharted 
regulatory spaces.3
Given such puzzlement, it might seem natural to ask whether the current regula-
tory environment is fit for purpose. However, this is not the first question that many 
lawyers ask. Rather, as I have already intimated, their opening question, and the 
source of much of their puzzlement, is about how these new technologies fit with 
existing doctrinal templates and classifications. In other words, the question is about 
where we should file these phenomena within existing classificatory schemes, not 
about whether our classificatory schemes are fit for purpose.
In this article, I do not hope to be able to remove all the puzzlement and answer 
all the questions. However, I hope to clarify which questions we really should be 
asking and why so. To do this, I will proceed in four stages. First, I will offer an 
example of a contractual claim (made by a third-party beneficiary) which the courts, 
historically, would not have enforced and which might have seemed like an eligible 
case for the use of smart contract technology (had it been available at the time). 
With this example, we have a context in which we can begin to address the ques-
tions that we have about how the law of contract and fiat contracts relate to smart 
contracts as well as about the likelihood of fiat contracts being replaced by smart 
contracts. Secondly, I will outline two principal conversations (each with their dis-
tinctive agenda of questions) that we might have about smart contracts. One con-
versation (a ‘coherentist’ conversation) focuses on how smart contracts fit with the 
law of contract; the other conversation (a ‘regulatory-instrumentalist’ conversation) 
focuses on whether the law is fit for purpose. Thirdly, I will address the question of 
1 Greenfield (2017), p 115.
2 For some of the already large literature on the legal concerns arising from blockchain, see Zetzsche 
et al. (2017a), pp 5–9.
3 Casey and Vigna (2018), pp 53–61.
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whether smart contracts prefigure the end of contracts, contract law, and a ‘trans-
actionalist’4 understanding of the basis for the rights and duties arising from a con-
tract. Finally, I will ask whether we have missed anything that really matters in our 
questions and conversations; and, in response, I will sketch some fundamental mat-
ters that are missing from our conversations.
My conclusion is that, in general, we would do better to start with a regula-
tory-instrumentalist conversation, seeking to establish what the benefits and risks 
of smart contracts might be and then putting in place a regulatory framework that 
strikes a reasonable balance between whatever competing interests there might be. 
However, this is not sufficient. We also need to reinvent our coherentist conversation 
so that it engages with the deeper questions of the kind of community that we value 
and really want to be.
2  Smart Contracts: A Possible Example
In what circumstances might it make sense to employ a smart contract? Where the 
infrastructure for commerce and contracts is altogether lacking, or is compromised, 
smart contracts might well be a significant option.5 However, where a viable infra-
structure for transactions is in place, smart contracts are likely to be used (at least 
initially) in a more ‘interstitial’ way, filling in where there are gaps in existing sup-
port, or responding to new markets that are not satisfactorily served by existing pro-
visions. In this article, I will assume that the context for discussing smart contracts 
(and their relationship to the law of contract) is one in which there is already an 
established and viable infrastructure for commerce and transactions (although not 
necessarily one that fully responds either to the ways in which business is organised6 
or to the needs of transactors who are neither business suppliers nor consumers7).
Typically, examples of smart contracts take the form of a coded instruction for a 
‘payment’ to be made by A to B conditional on the occurrence of some event (if x, 
then y). While one of the stock examples of such a smart contract, that of a bet or 
wager, fits this specification, it is hardly typical of everyday contracts for the supply 
of goods or services. I suggest that a better example can be found in some familiar 
nineteenth-century jurisprudence in which one of the leading cases is Tweddle v. 
Atkinson.8
Essentially, the form of the dispute in Tweddle v. Atkinson was as follows. It was 
agreed between A and B that they would each pay a sum of money to C (who was 
the son of A) on the marriage of C to D (D being the daughter of B). C duly mar-
ried D. However, B died before his portion of the agreed sum had been paid to C. 
4 ‘Transactionalism’ holds that the justification for treating parties as bound by their contractual obliga-
tions is that they have voluntarily agreed to (committed to) the deal.
5 Casey and Vigna (2018), pp 1–15.
6 A case in point is that of business networks: see Brownsword (2012a).
7 As with ‘prosumers’ in the rapidly developing share economy: see, e.g., Butenko and Cseres (2015).
8 (1861) 25 JP 517, 1 B & S 393, 30 LJQB 265.
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Although A and B had expressly agreed that C should be entitled to enforce the con-
tract, the court declined to enforce the agreement at the suit of C. Whatever the pre-
cise doctrinal reason for treating C as ineligible to enforce the contract between A 
and B, the fact of the matter was that the court would not assist C. Given this restric-
tion in the law, had smart contract technologies been available at the time, we might 
think that this was just the kind of case in which their use might have appealed to 
A and B. For the smart contract would simply need to be coded for payment of the 
agreed sum in the event of the marriage taking place: that is to say, the technology 
would ensure that, once the marriage of C and D had taken place, then the agreed 
sums would be paid to C.
Fast forwarding to 2019, English law is no longer so restrictive, one of the prin-
cipal purposes of the Contracts (Rights Against Third Parties) Act, 1999, being to 
give third-party beneficiaries, such as C, a right to enforce in precisely such a case as 
Tweddle v. Atkinson (where this was clearly the intention of A and B).9 Accordingly, 
in a similar post-Act scenario, the calculation for A and B would be different. The 
risk would be not so much that C might be left without a legal remedy but that the 
practical cost of obtaining a remedy might be an issue for C. Hence, for A and B, the 
question would be whether, all things considered, their preferred option is to commit 
the contract to the blockchain.
On the basis of this example, we can make two points that seem relevant to easing 
some of the perplexity that surrounds smart contracts. The first point (in Sect. 2.1) 
relates to the question of whether smart contracts fit the template for fiat contracts 
and, concomitantly, how the law of contract might be applied where smart contracts 
are used; and, the second point (in Sect. 2.2) relates to the question of whether smart 
contracts might come to dominate the transactional landscape.
2.1  Smart Contracts, Fiat Contracts, and the Law of Contract
A recurrent question in the early engagement with smart contracts is whether they 
meet the criteria for a standard fiat contract.10 Whereas standard fiat contracts for, 
say, the supply of goods or services are formed by an ‘offer and acceptance’ between 
the supplier and the customer and they are represented by an exchange of ‘consid-
eration’ (on the one side, the goods or services to be supplied and, on the other, 
the price to be paid),11 both the process for creating a smart contract and the lines 
9 For commentary, see Adams et al. (1997). To the extent that the reform of the privity rule required a 
legislative intervention, this suggests a regulatory-instrumentalist approach. However, to the extent that 
the reform was based on classical contractual principles (giving effect to the intentions of the contracting 
parties), rather than addressing the commercial inconvenience of the rule, this was more like a coherent-
ist exercise.
10 For example, see Werbach and Cornell (2017), pp 338 et seq.; and Farrell, Machin and Hinchliffe 
(2017), pp 96 et seq.
11 See, e.g., Adams and Brownsword (2007).
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of computer coding that then represent that contract look rather different.12 As De 
Filippi and Wright put it:
Where traditional legal agreements and smart contracts begin to differ is in the 
ability of smart contracts to enforce obligations by using autonomous code. 
With smart contracts, performance obligations are not written in standard legal 
prose. Rather, these obligations are memorialized in the code […] using a 
strict and formal programming language (like Ethereum’s Solidity).13
Accordingly, if we focus narrowly on the coded instructions that express the 
smart contract, we might well wonder whether what we are looking at does meet the 
criteria for a fiat contract. There are several points to make in relation to this ques-
tion about the characterisation of smart contracts.
First, let us suppose that we translate the computer coding into a natural language. 
If, once the coded instructions are translated back into a natural language, they do 
not reveal a ‘deal’ (an exchange of values), then this particular smart contract will 
still not look like a fiat contract—but, of course, this follows from the fact that there 
is no deal, not from the fact that this is a smart contract. By contrast, if the translated 
smart contract does disclose a deal, then (other things being equal14) this has the 
makings of a fiat contract. So, we should not jump to the conclusion that smart con-
tracts can never be treated as standard fiat contracts simply because some examples 
of smart contracts do not have the basic elements for a standard fiat contract.
Secondly, anticipating a matter to which we will return in Sect. 3 of the article, 
where a smart contract is being used as a tool to give effect to a standard fiat con-
tract, the law of contract will engage with the latter and only indirectly with the 
former. To explain, in our example (based on Tweddle v. Atkinson), suppose that C 
and D marry but the Oracle (the off-chain trusted third-party information provider) 
does not transmit that the relevant event has taken place. As a result, the transfer 
to C is not triggered. Setting aside the possibility that C might have a legal claim 
against the Oracle, C’s obvious remedy is to sue A and B for breach of their (stand-
ard fiat) contract. To be sure, C’s complaint is that the smart contract has not worked 
as intended; but, if we set aside the possible liability of others, C is arguing that the 
responsibility for this failure lies with A and B. At no point does C’s claim against A 
and B—a claim for breach of contract against A and B—seem to hinge on whether 
the smart contract itself fits the standard specification for a fiat contract.
Thirdly, the previous point notwithstanding, we should not assume that the puz-
zle about the characterisation of smart contracts is entirely ‘academic’. The ques-
tion might have practical relevance in some scenarios. However, whatever the fea-
tures of those scenarios they will be ones where, unlike in our example, smart (or 
12 Compare, for example, the ‘tutorial’ on creating a smart contract at https ://mediu m.com/@Conse 
nSys/a-101-noob-intro -to-progr ammin g-smart -contr acts-on-ether eum-695d1 5c1da b4 (accessed 1 July 
2018).
13 De Filippi and Wright (2018), p 74.
14 For example, even if there is a ‘deal’, it will not be treated as a fiat contract unless it is supported by 
an intention to create legal relations: see Balfour v. Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571.
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algorithmic) contracts have a life of their own detached from fiat contracts or club 
rules, and with human contractors fully out of the loop.15
2.2  Smart Contracts and the Transactional Landscape
Will smart contracts, as it were, sweep the transactional board? Do they, in effect, 
spell the end of fiat contracts and contract law? The latter is a question to which we 
will return in Sect. 4. However, in our particular example, there are at least three rea-
sons for thinking that A and B might not have chosen to use a smart contract.
First, the context in which A and B agreed to pay sums to C was one of a poten-
tially closer relationship between the two families. Even if the families had not pre-
viously ‘got on’—indeed, even if A and B did not trust one another—this might 
have been exactly the wrong time to suggest the use of smart contracts and signal 
this lack of trust. Secondly, unless the smart contracts were so smart as to use fiat 
currency, the inconvenience of obtaining, or subscribing to, the particular cryptocur-
rency might deter A and B from making use of the technological option. Moreover, 
even if this inconvenience did not deter A and B, the cryptocurrency might not be 
welcomed by C which, in turn, might steer A and B away from this option. Thirdly, 
if there are concerns about ‘bugs’ in smart contract coding or if there is any doubt 
about the reliability of Oracles and off-chain sources, A and B might prefer not to 
take the risk.
It follows that, even where we can find a gap in legal support for transactions, 
there might be reasons—arising from the context, or the nature of the transaction, or 
simply reasons of net disutility—that militate against reliance on smart contracts. To 
this we should add some further limitations on the potential use of smart contracts. 
One limitation is that, so long as smart contracts are restricted to making a transfer 
of value, they cannot undertake the counter-performance (the supply of [non-digital] 
goods or services) that is still characteristic of fiat contracts. Another limitation is 
that, for some time, coders are likely to be challenged by those many contractual 
principles and terms that turn on vague concepts such as ‘reasonableness’, or ‘good 
faith’, or the use of ‘best endeavours’, and so on.16 Yet another limitation might be 
that smart contracts can present a risk of commercially sensitive or confidential 
information being disclosed.17 And, a further limitation might arise where a buyer is 
concerned that a seller might become insolvent; here, a smart contract for payment 
to the seller will only work for the buyer if payment is contingent on actual perfor-
mance by the seller.18
So, simply because there are costs associated with litigation and legal enforce-
ment it does not follow that A and B will judge it smart or appropriate to take the 
17 See, e.g., De Filippi and Wright (2018), pp 83–84.
18 To be sure, in principle, a smart contract might be coded or ‘architected’ in just the way that the buyer 
needs; but the practical question is whether the seller will agree to such an arrangement. For further 
issues relating to insolvency, see Farrell et al. (2017).
15 For some helpful reflections along such lines, see Scholz (2017).
16 See, e.g., De Filippi and Wright (2018), p 77.
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blockchain option. The context for the deal, the relationship between the parties, the 
nature of the transaction, and the overall calculation of utility and disutility remain 
critical to A and B’s decision whether to employ a smart contract.
That said, we should not discount the possibility that, in future (as in the past), we 
might find that the provisions of the law of contract or of the regulatory environment 
more generally do not align well with the way that business is being done or the way 
that business might be done. In some cases—for example, where members of a local 
community wish to generate their own renewable energy and to trade their surpluses 
within their own market—bottom-up self-regulatory smart contracts might be much 
more fit for purpose than heavy top-down regulatory regimes.19 Similarly, where 
micro payments need to be transferred, perhaps smart contracts will be the answer 
to a problem.20 To this extent, smart contracts might be the future. Indeed, perhaps 
smart contracts, like autonomous vehicles, will one day fully replace human ‘driven’ 
transactions and transport. For some time, though, it seems safe to assume that fiat 
contracts (governed by the law of contract) will continue to be a feature of the trans-
actional landscape.21
3  Two Conversations
Generally speaking, where new technologies emerge—whether the technologies in 
question are relevant to either transactions or human interactions—we can expect 
lawyers to engage with these developments in either a coherentist or a regulatory-
instrumentalist way. This gives rise to two distinct conversations, each with its own 
questions and concerns.
We can start by sketching, first (in Sect.  3.1), the characteristics of coherent-
ist thought and then (in Sect.  3.2) the characteristics of regulatory-instrumentalist 
thinking. After that, (in Sect. 3.3) we can see how a coherentist conversation about 
smart contracts might go and then (in Sect. 3.4) do the same in relation to a regula-
tory-instrumentalist conversation.
3.1  Coherentism
Coherentism is defined by three characteristics.22 First, for coherentists, what mat-
ters above all is the integrity and internal consistency of legal doctrine. This is 
viewed as desirable in and of itself. Secondly, coherentists are not concerned with 
the fitness of the law for its regulatory purpose. Thirdly, coherentists approach new 
19 Compare Butenko and Cseres (2015) and Lammers and Diestelmeier (2017).
20 See, e.g., De Filippi and Wright (2018), p 76 (concerning Ujo Music’s website for the sale of digital 
music files).
21 We should also anticipate that the law of contract might be relevant to the characterisation, not of 
smart contracts, but rather of the network of nodes that support the distributed ledger system: for discus-
sion, see Zetzsche et al. (2017a).
22 See Brownsword (2018a).
12 R. Brownsword 
123
transactional technologies by asking how they fit within existing legal categories 
(and then try hard to fit them in). Coherentism is, thus, the natural language of litiga-
tors and judges, who seek to apply the law in a principled way.23
However, according to Edward Rubin, the days of coherentism are numbered. 
Nowadays, Rubin claims, we live in the age of modern administrative states where 
the law is used ‘as a means of implementing the policies that [each particular state] 
adopts. The rules that are declared, and the statutes that enact them, have no nec-
essary relationship with one another; they are all individual and separate acts of 
will’.24 In the modern administrative state, the ‘standard for judging the value of 
law is not whether it is coherent but rather whether it is effective, that is, effective in 
establishing and implementing the policy goals of the modern state’.25
In contrast to such modern regulatory thinking, coherentism presupposes a world 
of, at most, leisurely change. It is not geared for making agile responses to rapidly 
emerging and highly disruptive technologies. When they are called on to respond to 
new technological developments, coherentists tend to try to classify the new phe-
nomena within existing legal categories. For example, a nice coherentist question 
might be whether, with humans out of the transactional loop, automated and autono-
mous performance systems could be treated relative to recognised legal concepts 
and categories (such as the limited liability company) as having their own legal per-
sonality.26 Similarly, when the technologies that support e-commerce appeared, the 
coherentist response was to try to fit the legal template for off-line contracts to the 
emerging world of on-line transactions.27
3.2  Regulatory‑Instrumentalism
In contrast with coherentism, regulatory-instrumentalism is defined by the follow-
ing three features.28 First, as Rubin explains, it is not concerned with the internal 
consistency of legal doctrine. Secondly, it is entirely focused on whether the law is 
instrumentally effective in serving specified regulatory purposes. Regulatory-instru-
mentalists do not ask whether the law is coherent but whether it works. Thirdly, 
regulatory instrumentalism has no reservation about enacting new bespoke laws if 
this is an effective and efficient response to a question raised by new transactional 
technologies. Regulatory-instrumentalism is, thus, the (democratically) mandated 
language of legislators, policy-makers, and regulatory agencies.29
23 For a somewhat similar view, presented as a ‘legalistic approach’ to emerging technologies, see Petit 
(2018).
24 Rubin (2017), p 311.
25 Rubin (2017), p 328.
26 Compare Bayern et al. (2017), where company structures that are provided for in US, German, Swiss, 
and UK law are reviewed to see whether they might plausibly act as a host for autonomous systems that 
provide a service (such as file storage, file retrieval and metadata management).
27 For discussion, see Brownsword (2017a).
28 See Brownsword (2018a).
29 For example, the UK Financial Conduct Authority is conspicuously sensitised to ‘reg tech’ (in the 
sense of utilising information technologies to enhance regulatory processes with a particular emphasis on 
monitoring, reporting and compliance): see FCA Press Release 20/02/2018, available at https ://www.fca.
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From the industrial revolution onwards—at any rate, in the common law world—
the direction of travel in criminal law, torts and contracts has been away from coher-
entism and towards regulatory-instrumentalism. While intentionality and fault were 
set aside in the regulatory parts of criminal law and torts, classical transactionalist 
(‘meeting of the minds’) ideas of consent and agreement were marginalised, being 
replaced in the mainstream of contract law by ‘objective’ tests and standards set by 
reasonable business practice. As Morton Horwitz puts it, there was a dawning sense 
that ‘all law was a reflection of collective determination, and thus inherently regula-
tory and coercive’.30
What we see across these developments is a pattern of disruption to legal doc-
trines that were organically expressed in smaller-scale non-industrialised com-
munities. Here, the legal rules presuppose very straightforward ideas about hold-
ing to account those who engage intentionally in injurious or dishonest acts, about 
expecting others to act with reasonable care, and about holding others to their word. 
Once new technologies disrupt these ideas, we see the move to strict or absolute 
criminal liability without proof of intent, to tortious liability without proof of fault, 
and to contractual liability (or limitation of liability) without proof of actual intent, 
agreement or consent. Even if the development in contract is less clear at this stage, 
in both criminal law and torts we can see the early signs of a risk management 
approach to liability. Moreover, we also see the early signs of doctrinal bifurcation, 
with some parts of criminal law, tort law and contract law resting on traditional prin-
ciples (and representing, so to speak, ‘real’ crime, tort and contract) while others 
deviate from these principles—often holding enterprises to account more readily 
but also sometimes easing the burden on business for the sake of beneficial innova-
tion31—in order to strike a more acceptable balance of the benefits and risks that 
technological development brings with it.32
This, however, is just the beginning, not the end, of the story of the technological 
disruption of the law. With a risk management approach well-established, regula-
tors (in both the public and the private sector) now find that they have the option of 
employing various technological instruments rather than rules.33 This is the moment 
when, so to speak, we see a very clear contrast between the legal and regulatory 
rule-based style of the East coast and the technocratic regulatory style of the West 
coast.34
31 For example, in the United States, the interests of the farming community were subordinated to the 
greater good promised by the development of the railroad network: see Horwitz (1977).
32 Compare, too, Pagallo (2013), p 190, writing about the technological intermediation of transac-
tions: ‘[The proposal for] the personal liability of robots demonstrates a fruitful way of striking a bal-
ance between the different human interests involved, namely, between the interest of the counterparties 
of robots to safely transact or interact with them, and the claim of users and owners of robots not to be 
ruined by the growing autonomy and even unpredictability of their behaviour.’.
33 Brownsword (2015, 2016).
34 Seminally, see Lessig (1999). See, too, Brownsword (2005).
org.uk/news/press -relea ses/fca-launc hes-call-input -use-techn ology -achie ve-smart er-regul atory -repor ting 
(accessed 26 May 2018).
Footnote 29 (continued)
30 Horwitz (1992), p 50.
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In principle, the technocratic approach might employ measures at the soft end of 
a spectrum (where they support the rules and encourage compliance) or measures at 
the hard end (where they replace the rules and aim to guarantee compliance).35 At 
the hard end of this spectrum, two things are characteristic of so-called technologi-
cal management.36 First, as I have emphasised elsewhere, unlike rules, the focus of 
the regulatory intervention is on the practical (not the paper) options of regulatees.37 
Secondly, whereas legal rules back their prescriptions with ex post penal, compensa-
tory, or restorative measures, the focus of technological management is entirely ex 
ante, aiming to anticipate and prevent wrongdoing rather than punish or compensate 
after the event. As Lee Bygrave puts it in the context of the design of information 
systems and the protection of both intellectual property rights (IPRs) and privacy, 
the assumption is that, by embedding norms in the architecture, there is ‘the promise 
of a significantly increased ex ante application of the norms and a corresponding 
reduction in relying on their application ex post facto’.38
This evolution in regulatory thinking is not surprising. Having recognised the lim-
ited fitness of traditional legal rules, and having taken a more regulatory approach, 
the next step is to think not just in terms of risk assessment and risk management but 
also to be mindful of the technological instruments that increasingly become avail-
able for use by regulators. In this way, the regulatory mind-set is focused not only on 
the risks to be managed but also how best to manage those risks (including making 
use of technological measures, whether soft or hard).
Writing in the context of non-negotiable terms and conditions in online consumer 
contracts, Joshua Fairfield expresses just this kind of technocratic thought when he 
remarks that ‘if courts [or, we might say, the rules of contract law] will not protect 
consumers, robots will’.39 Imagine, for example, that regulators or consumers (just 
like legal practitioners) were able to rely on smart machines to scan on-line terms 
and conditions to see which, if any, were arguably unfair40; or imagine that a sup-
plier’s standard terms and conditions had to be displayed in a format that would not 
permit anything other than clearly fair terms. While, in the former case, such an 
assistive technocratic intervention might support a transactionalist policy (improv-
ing the likelihood that consumers who agree to the proferred terms and conditions 
have done so on an informed basis), in the latter a harder technological measure 
might achieve a more acceptable balance of interests.
3.3  A Coherentist Conversation about Smart Contracts
The principal topic of coherentist conversation is likely to be whether a smart con-
tract is to be regarded as, in principle, a legally enforceable contract (as per the law 
35 See, e.g., O’Malley (2013), p 280.
36 Brownsword (2015, 2016).
37 See, e.g., Brownsword (2012b, 2017b).
38 Bygrave (2017), p 755.
39 Fairfield (2014), p 39.
40 Compare Micklitz et al. (2017).
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of contract). Viewing the coded transactional instructions as the prospective con-
tract, coherentists will be puzzled by many things. In particular, they will wonder 
where we find the offer, the acceptance, and the consideration when all that we have 
is a coded instruction to transfer a specified value from A’s wallet to B’s wallet on 
the occurrence of some specified event. Moreover, the technology is designed to 
guarantee that, on the occurrence of the specified event, the value is duly transferred 
from A to B. So, how is it possible to apply doctrines that allow for the avoidance 
of a transaction—for example, doctrines such as duress and undue influence, or mis-
representation—to a smart contract; or, in the event that the technology fails to per-
form, how should we determine whether there has been a breach (and, if so, how are 
we to decide upon the nature of the breach and the appropriate remedy)? Further-
more, how can this possibly be viewed as a contract when the terms and conditions 
are not written in natural language and when there are no humans in the blockchain 
loop? To the coherentist, the idea that a smart contract can be likened to an agree-
ment for the supply of goods or services (the staple of the law of contract) will be 
perplexing indeed.41
However, as we have already suggested in Sect. 2, much of the puzzlement might 
be eased if we place the bare content of the smart contract in the context in which 
it has been formed. After all, the coded agreement on the blockchain does not come 
out of nowhere.42 Recalling our example in Sect. 2, the story starts with an off-chain 
off-line discussion between A and B in which they agree to pay a sum to C on the 
occasion of C’s marriage to D and in which they consider using a smart contract to 
execute the agreement. The agreement between A and B to pay the sum, and what-
ever they agree about using a smart contract to give effect to that agreement, will 
have all the ingredients that coherentists look for in a standard fiat contract—there is 
simply no special problem here about offer and acceptance and consideration. Nor is 
there a puzzle about the application of doctrines such as duress or undue influence. 
For example, if A has applied unfair pressure to B to commit to the deal, B might 
take court action in an attempt to avoid the transaction before it has been committed 
to the blockchain; if B tries to avoid the transaction when it is on the blockchain but 
not yet executed, it might not be possible to prevent the payment being made but, in 
principle, a court might order C to restore the value received. So, provided that the 
content of the smart contract is not abstracted from the off-chain context in which 
the transaction originated, there might be little to puzzle coherentists.
What, though, if the smart contract is not properly executed? In Sect. 2, we con-
sidered a claim by C (against A and B) when the Oracle fails to advise that the 
marriage has taken place, so that no payment is made when it should have been. In 
such a scenario, if C seeks performance of the contract between A and B, this will 
turn on the background agreement (which is treated as a standard fiat contract) in 
conjunction with whatever the third-party beneficiary rules are in the applicable law. 
What, though, if it is the converse case, with the Oracle incorrectly advising that 
41 For example, see the discussion in Werbach and Cornell (2017), pp 338 et seq.
42 Compare De Filippi and Wright (2018), pp 74 et seq. At p 78, we read: ‘Even where smart contracts 
entirely replace formal legal agreements, these programs do not operate in a vacuum’.
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the marriage between C and D has taken place, so that the payment is made when it 
should not have been? In such a scenario, quite apart from any claim against the Ora-
cle, there might be a restitutionary mechanism to reverse the payment without hav-
ing to decide whether the smart contract is a contract as such43; or, it might be that 
the background agreement between A and B provides for a risk of this kind (allocat-
ing the risk to one of the parties and, possibly, providing also for insurance against 
the risk). Accordingly, there is no need for coherentists to lose much, if any, sleep 
over these puzzles. Furthermore, if there really is a problem in fitting the contract 
law template to the configuration of the blockchain then, as Lord Wilberforce once 
remarked, the courts—confronted by modern forms of transport, various kinds of 
automation, and novel business practices—have proved pretty adept at forcing ‘the 
facts to fit uneasily into the marked slots of offer, acceptance and consideration’44 or 
whatever other traditional categories of the law of contract might be applicable.
These matters aside, coherentists might ask an interesting question about the 
relationship between the transactional effects that smart contracts might have and 
those that the courts, applying the law of contract, are willing to mandate. Where 
the effects generated by the former are identical to those mandated by the courts, 
there is no problem. However, in some cases, the effect of using smart contracts 
might be to produce transactional effects or outcomes that would not be mandated 
by the courts. Indeed, the example given in Sect. 2 of the article is precisely such a 
case because, while the use of a smart contract might lead to C being paid the sum 
agreed by A and B, this outcome would not be mandated by courts that are applying 
a restrictive third-party beneficiary rule (as was the case in English law before the 
1999 Act). That said, if A and B simply gave a sum of money to C (in anticipation 
of C’s marriage to D), I take it that this would be permissible; and their intention 
if they commit their agreement to a smart contract is not different in any material 
way—it is not transformed into an intention to engage in some unlawful or imper-
missible activity. In other words, so long as the smart contract has a permissible 
purpose, the fact that it achieves something that the courts would not assist with is 
not a problem. Elsewhere, I have explored in some detail the relationship between 
prohibitions and permissions alongside the distinctions between encouraging a per-
mitted act, discouraging the act, and neither encouraging nor discouraging that act.45 
The key point is that, while it does follow from the fact that an act is prohibited that 
it should not be encouraged or assisted (hence, if the ‘public policy’ restrictions in 
contract law are in the nature of prohibitions, the offending transactions should not 
be enforced), it does not follow from the fact that an act is permissible that it should 
be encouraged or assisted. Hence, it does not follow that the courts should neces-
sarily support or assist with the enforcement of a transaction simply because it is 
43 In English law, the decision of the UK Supreme Court in Patel v. Mirza [2016] UKSC 42 has signifi-
cantly raised the profile of a possible restitutionary response to claims arising in connection with illegal 
contracts.
44 See, New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v. A.M. Satterthwaite and Co Ltd: The Eurymedon [1975] AC 
154, 167. For a somewhat similar view, see Petit (2018).
45 Brownsword (2014a).
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permitted. To be sure, unless the reason for the courts’ unwillingness to assist is 
obvious, we might expect some explanation. Essentially, though, this is no differ-
ent from a parent who permits a teenage son or daughter to engage in some activity 
without also agreeing to support it (usually by declining to pay for it).
3.4  A Regulatory‑Instrumentalist Conversation about Smart Contracts
Unlike a coherentist conversation, a regulatory-instrumentalist conversation will not 
focus on the application of the law of contract to smart contracts. Rather, the con-
versation will seek to identify the potential benefits and risks of committing trans-
actions (or parts of transactions) to a blockchain and it will then strive to find an 
acceptable balance between management of the risks and not stifling enterprise. The 
challenge is to find the regulatory sweet spot, neither over-regulating (and stifling 
innovation) nor under-regulating and exposing parties to unacceptable risks.46
Where the conversation is between top-down national regulators, there might 
well be various consultations, commissions and debates before a position is adopted. 
The regulation that eventuates might be in a hard law or a soft law form. There is no 
standard operating procedure for engaging with and making regulatory responses to 
emerging technologies.
In this context, we should note that the Law Commission has smart contracts in its 
most recently announced programme of work.47 In the Commission’s short descrip-
tion of the project, we might detect signs of coherentist thinking. This is because 
the Commission, mindful that blockchain transactional records cannot be rectified or 
reversed, wonders (in an apparently coherentist way) ‘how this feature would inter-
act with contract law concepts such as implied terms or contracts which are held 
to have been void from the outset’.48 However, the Commission’s initial thinking is 
more complex: its coherentist questions are posed alongside a background regula-
tory-instrumentalist concern that, if English courts and law are to remain a competi-
tive choice for business contractors, then there ‘is a compelling case for reviewing 
the current English legal and regulatory framework to ensure that it facilitates the 
use of smart contracts’.49
It remains to be seen precisely how the Commission will approach the project. 
However, to the extent that puzzles of the kind that occupy coherentists need to be 
resolved, regulatory-instrumentalists will simply recommend that legislation that 
does the particular job should be introduced. Such was the regulatory-instrumen-
talist response to the embryonic development of e-commerce (for the avoidance of 
doubt, the law declared that, in principle, on-line transactions should be treated as 
legally binding, that there should be an equivalence between the law for off-line 
46 Compare the excellent discussion of the regulation of ‘TechFins’ in Zetzsche et al. (2017b), pp 31 et 
seq.
47 Law Commission (2017).
48 Law Commission (2017), p 20.
49 Law Commission (2017), p 20.
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transactions and the law for on-line transactions)50; and, indeed, in some US states, 
there are already regulatory-instrumentalist moves to ensure that, in principle, smart 
contracts should be recognised as legally valid and that blockchain records should 
be treated as legally admissible.51
According to Aaron Wright and Primavera De Filippi, the implementation of 
blockchain-based governance, with ‘transparent decision-making procedures and 
[…] decentralized incentives systems for collaboration and cooperation could make 
it easier for small and large communities to reach consensus and implement innova-
tive forms of self-governance’.52 If this prospect were to encourage some business 
communities to adopt smart contracts, then there would surely be another regula-
tory-instrumentalist conversation but this time of a bottom-up self-regulating nature.
Consider, for example, the idea that business contractors who are in international 
sales and carriage of goods by sea might use smart contracts, instead of letters of 
credit, as a way of securing the seller’s interest in being paid and the buyer’s interest 
in having the goods delivered. The idea is that the smart contract would provide that 
a specified value should be transferred from the buyer’s to the seller’s wallet when 
specified goods have reached a certain specified stage or point in their carriage and 
delivery. In principle, this might be an instruction to transfer the full payment for the 
goods or it might be coded for a series of stage payments (during the period from 
shipment to delivery). So, the question for our hypothetical business community is 
whether they see net utility in doing business using smart contracts or continuing 
to trade by using letters of credit. I will not attempt to second-guess the answer to 
this hypothetical question although I take it that the use of smart contracts would be 
facilitated if there were accepted customs and conventions that shaped and stabi-
lised the expectations of parties who committed their agreement (or part thereof) to 
a blockchain.
In this regard, we should clarify the relevance of coherentist concerns in a regu-
latory-instrumentalist conversation about the respective benefits and risks of using 
smart contracts or relying on letters of credit. For regulatory-instrumentalists such 
concerns are relevant only if the doctrinal puzzles and doubts might translate into 
practical risks. Now, if the biggest perceived practical risk is that, in a dispute 
between the parties, the courts might not treat the smart contract as if it were a fiat 
contract, that is perhaps not such a serious concern. As we have already said, where 
smart contracts are used in the shadow of background fiat contracts or agreements, it 
is to the latter that the law of contract will be applied.
50 See, Brownsword (2017a).
51 As to the former, a legislative amendment (HB 2417) to the Arizona Electronic Transactions Act pro-
vides that a contract relating to a transaction may not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability 
solely because that contract contains ‘a smart contract term’: see, e.g., https ://newme diala w.prosk auer.
com/2017/04/20/arizo na-passe s-groun dbrea king-block chain -and-smart -contr act-law-state -block chain 
-laws-on-the-rise/ (last accessed 7 July 2018); and, as to the latter, see, e.g., the initiative in Vermont: 
https ://law.justi a.com/codes /vermo nt/2016/title -12/chapt er-81/secti on-1913 (last accessed 24 March 
2018).
52 Wright and De Filippi (2015), p 38. See, too, De Filippi and Wright (2018).
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Furthermore, we should recall the classic coherentist puzzle that focuses on the 
relationship between the seller and the paying bank to which the seller presents the 
specified documents against which the bank (acting for the buyer) should pay the 
seller. The puzzle is that the seller seemingly gives no consideration for the bank’s 
services; the bank’s commission is covered by the buyer; and it follows that, in 
a sometimes quite long chain of contracts, there is no direct connecting link (no 
contract) between the seller and the bank. This being so, if the bank declined to 
pay against the seller’s presentation of conforming documents, one response to the 
seller’s claim for breach of contract by the bank would be that there is no contract 
between the parties and, thus, no contractual obligation owed by the bank to the 
seller. However, if the courts accepted this argument it would compromise the whole 
basis on which letters of credit are founded and it would be worse than commercially 
inconvenient. So, if the commercial courts were to be asked an analogous question 
about a blockchain arrangement, and assuming that smart contracts were embedded 
in the custom and practice of international trade, it is unlikely that they would want 
to compromise the basis on which business was done.53 Granted, we might not be 
altogether confident that a court would be so ready to accommodate the actualities 
of business practice during its embryonic development; but, in the longer run, if 
smart contracts are a part of business as usual, the commercial courts are unlikely to 
go against the grain of practice and the parties’ expectations.
4  The End of Contract?
In Sect. 2, I suggested that it will not be any time soon that smart contracts fully dis-
place standard fiat contracts. Nevertheless, there is a concern that we pay a price for 
the emerging technostructure for transactions.54 For instance, according to Shoshana 
Zuboff, a new form of (surveillance) capitalism may install a new kind of sovereign 
power,55 where a big data corporation
may sell access to an insurance company, and this company purchases the 
right to intervene in an information loop in your car or your kitchen in order to 
increase its revenues or reduce its costs. It may shut off your car, because you 
are driving too fast. It may lock your fridge when you put yourself at risk of 
heart disease or diabetes by eating too much ice cream. You might then face 
the prospect of either higher premiums or loss of coverage […]. [S]uch pos-
sibilities […] represent the end of contracts. […] [They replace] the rule of 
law and the necessity of social trust as the basis for human communities with a 
new life-world of rewards and punishments, stimulus and response.56
53 For a particularly influential articulation of this view, see Steyn (1997).
54 Compare, Kerr (2004).
55 Zuboff (2015).
56 Zuboff (2015), pp 85–86 (emphasis added).
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Yet, is this right? Is this the end of transactionalism? If transactions are techno-
logically managed, does this represent the end of contracts? And is this the end of 
the line for the law of contracts?
In an uncompromising form, transactionalism will treat a deal between A and 
B as the legitimate source of the parties’ rights and obligations inter se only if A 
and B each truly agreed to the deal. However, such a thoroughgoing commitment 
to subjectivism threatens to jeopardise both reliance on, and the utility of, contracts. 
Not surprisingly, then, in nineteenth-century America, against the background of an 
‘increasingly national corporate economy, the goal of standardization of commercial 
transactions began to overwhelm the desire to conceive of contract law as expressing 
the subjective desires of individuals’.57 At the same time, in English law, in addi-
tion to the general shift to an objective approach, there was a particularly significant 
shift to a reasonable notice model in relation to the incorporation of the terms and 
conditions on which carriers (of both goods and persons) purported to contract. In 
the jurisprudence, this latter shift is symbolised by Mellish LJ’s direction to the jury 
in Parker v. South Eastern Railway Co,58 where the legal test was said to be not so 
much whether a customer actually was aware of the terms and had agreed to them 
but whether the company had given reasonable notice.
In the twenty-first century, we need to ‘get real’ about transactionalism: ideal-typ-
ical transactionalism was left behind in the nineteenth century; and, the dealing and 
deals that take place in the consumer marketplace are heavily regulated transactions. 
So, if there is a concern that smart contracts are being abused in this marketplace—
recall the stock example of technological force being applied to immobilise a vehicle 
when the consumer hirer or purchaser is late with a payment—then there is likely to 
be a focused regulatory response. That said, if the acceptability of smart contracts 
is seen to hinge on background anchoring agreements or the like, then some might 
argue for a return to a robust transactionalist standard for the validity of such agree-
ments; but, even if this has some resonance in commercial dealing, in the consumer 
marketplace it seems likely that a non-transactional regulatory approach will con-
tinue to be dominant.
As for concerns about the end of contract, we again need to get real. Contract qua 
transactionalism is not to be found in the consumer marketplace; and, in the busi-
ness community, contract is at least as much about relational dealing (that is to say, 
contractual rights and obligations are taken to be based on the dealing (or dealings) 
between the parties, the context in which they have dealt, and the reasonable expec-
tations that they have in that setting59) as it is about applying the literal terms of the 
deal and transactionalism.
What will not survive in a world of automated transactions, where humans are 
taken out of the loop, is face to face dealing of the kind evoked by the traditional 
idea of contracts and haggling in a market place. Nevertheless, to repeat one of the 
57 Horwitz (1992), p 37. At pp 48–49, Horwitz notes a parallel transformation in relation to both corpo-
rate forms and agency.
58 (1877) 2 C.P.D. 416; and, see, Waddams (2011), p 39.
59 Seminally, see Macaulay (1963, 2003).
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points recurrently made in this article, the use of new transactional technologies, 
including blockchain and smart contracts, is likely to take place in the shadow of 
some agreement between off-chain human agents. In some cases, we might have to 
go quite a long way back to find the anchoring agreement or the signing up to the 
club rules, but these background agreements will be where we find the originating 
fiat contracts. In the case of business to consumer transacting, the automation of 
routine consumption is likely to be so pervasive that there will need to be a regu-
latory framework that determines an acceptable balance of stakeholders’ interests. 
Effectively, this is where we are today with traditional consumer contracting: there 
might be the form of a contract but there is little or nothing that is transactionalist 
about it. By contrast, businesses might continue to deal with one another in ways 
that reflect both transactionalist and relationalist understandings of a contractor’s 
rights and obligations. Here, the orginating agreements will testify to the persistence 
of contract, albeit in the background rather than the foreground where the technolo-
gies take care of performance.
5  Any Other Questions?
We have sketched the kinds of questions that both coherentists and regulatory-instru-
mentalists (including those with a technocratic mind-set) might ask about smart 
contracts. However, there are two further sets of questions that we have not asked 
and which we should always ask as new technologies are developed and become 
available for use.60
The first question is whether the technology or its application might present a 
threat to the deepest infrastructural conditions for human social existence (these 
being the conditions that represent, so to speak, ‘the commons’). Let me suggest that 
there are three critical dimensions to the commons—think of the worst-case dysto-
pia and it will almost certainly feature the compromising of one or more of these 
dimensions.61
The first dimension comprises, quite simply, the conditions for human exist-
ence. Here, regulators should take steps to protect, preserve and promote the natural 
ecosystem for human life.62 At minimum, this entails that the physical well-being 
of humans must be secured; humans need oxygen, they need food and water, they 
need shelter, they need protection against contagious diseases, if they are sick they 
need whatever medical treatment is available, and they need to be protected against 
assaults by other humans or non-human beings. It follows that the intentional viola-
tion of such conditions is a crime against, not just the individual humans who are 
directly affected, but humanity itself.63
60 These questions are dealt with at length in Brownsword (2018b).
61 Brownsword (2017c).
62 Compare Rockstrom (2009), and Raworth (2017), pp 43–55.
63 Compare Brownsword (2014b).
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Secondly, there is the dimension that comprises the conditions for meaningful 
self-development and agency. Regulators should ensure that, in this dimension, there 
are appropriate supportive and restrictive conditions for agents to flourish. In par-
ticular, there needs to be a sense of self-esteem and respect; agents need to feel that 
their agency matters; and there needs to be sufficient trust and confidence in one’s 
fellow agents, together with sufficient predictability to plan, so as to operate in a 
way that is interactive and purposeful rather than merely defensive.64 With exist-
ence secured, and under the right conditions, human life becomes an opportunity for 
agents to be who they want to be, to have the projects that they want to have, to form 
the relationships that they want, to pursue the interests that they choose to have and 
so on. In the twenty-first century, no other view of human potential and aspiration 
is plausible; in the twenty-first century, it is axiomatic that humans are prospective 
agents and that agents need to be free.
Thirdly, there is the dimension of moral aspiration. Here, regulators must secure 
and respect the conditions for a moral community, whether the particular commu-
nity is guided by teleological or deontological standards, by rights or by duties, by 
communitarian or liberal or libertarian values, and so on. The generic context for 
moral community is impartial between competing moral visions, values, and ideals; 
but it must be conducive to ‘moral’ development and ‘moral’ agency in a formal 
sense.
Agents who reason impartially will understand that each human agent is a stake-
holder in the commons that protects the essential conditions for human existence 
together with the generic conditions of agency; and that these conditions must, 
therefore, be respected. Beyond these conditions, the moral aspiration is to do the 
right thing relative not simply to one’s own interests but relative to the interests that 
other human agents might have. While respect for the commons’ conditions is bind-
ing on all human agents, these conditions do not rule out the possibility of contesta-
tion and pluralism. The point is that the commons itself, although neutral between 
competing and conflicting views, sets the stage for human agents to articulate many 
different (and potentially conflicting) preferences, priorities and positions (both pru-
dential and moral) that guide not only their personal lives but also their participation 
in regulatory arenas. Moral, political, legal and regulatory debates are all predicated 
on the existence of the commons.
With regard to the first of our two additional questions, it might well be that 
blockchain and smart contracts, unlike many other new technologies, do not present 
any threat to the commons’ conditions. However, we should always satisfy ourselves 
that we are not using technologies in ways that might prove catastrophic in the most 
fundamental sense of compromising the commons.
The second additional question, however, is one that is very much engaged by 
blockchain and smart contracts but it is one that we have not yet explicitly asked. 
This is the question of the particular kind of community—local as much as national 
community—that we want to be. What are our distinctive fundamental values? 
No doubt, those who advocate the further use of blockchain and smart contract 
64 Compare the insightful analysis of the importance of such conditions in Brincker (2017).
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applications have many reasons for taking the position that they do, but in that mix 
there is a certain sense of the kind of society that we might want to be, namely 
one that is distanced from the traditional financial institutions and marketplace inter-
mediaries, and one that places a higher value on community, co-operativism and 
solidarity.65
From the middle of the twentieth century, many nation states have expressed their 
fundamental (constitutional) values in terms of respect for human rights and human 
dignity.66 These values (most obviously the human right to life) clearly intersect 
with the commons’ conditions and there is much to debate about the nature of this 
relationship and the extent of any overlap. For example, if we understand the root 
idea of human dignity in terms of humans having the capacity freely to do the right 
thing for the right reason,67 then human dignity reaches directly to the commons’ 
conditions for moral agency68; and, similarly, if we understand privacy (whether 
derived from human rights or human dignity) as ring-fencing spaces for the self-
development of agents, then it is more than a fundamental value recognised by a 
particular community, it reaches through to the commons’ conditions themselves. 
However, those nation states that articulate their particular identities by the way in 
which they interpret their commitment to respect for human dignity are far from 
homogeneous. Whereas, in some communities, the emphasis of human dignity is on 
individual empowerment and autonomy, in others it is on constraints relating to the 
sanctity, non-commercialisation, non-commodification, and non-instrumentalisation 
of human life.69 These differences in emphasis mean that communities articulate in 
very different ways on a range of beginning of life and end of life questions as well 
as questions of lifestyle, human enhancement, and the limits of markets, and so on.
With rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and 
blockchain, a question that will become increasingly important is whether, and if so 
how far, a community sees itself as distinguished by its commitment to regulation 
by rule rather than by technological management.70 In some smaller scale communi-
ties or self-regulating groups, there might be resistance to a technocratic approach 
because compliance that is guaranteed by technological means compromises the 
context for trust—this might be the position, for example, in some business com-
munities (where self-enforcing transactional technologies are rejected)71; and, it will 
be recalled, this was highlighted as a possible reason that A and B (in our example 
65 See Greenfield (2017), esp. ch. 10; and, recall the example of the local market in renewable energy 
given in Sect. 2.2.
66 See Brownsword (2014c).
67 For such a view, see Brownsword (2013).
68 See, Brownsword (2017c).
69 See Beyleveld and Brownsword (2001), Caulfield and Brownsword (2006) and Brownsword (2008).
70 Compare De Filippi and Wright (2018), at p 210: ‘If blockchain technology matures, we may need 
to ask ourselves whether we would rather live in a world where most of our economic transactions 
and social interactions are constrained by rules of law—which are universal but also more flexible and 
ambiguous, and therefore not perfectly enforceable—or whether we would rather surrender ourselves to 
the rules of code’.
71 See, the excellent discussion in Levy (2017).
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in Sect. 2) might have for declining to use a smart contract. Or, again, a community 
might prefer to stick with regulation by rules because rules (unlike technological 
measures) allow for some interpretive flexibility, or because it values public par-
ticipation in setting standards and is worried that this might be more difficult if the 
debate were to become technocratic.72
If a community decides that it is generally happy with a regulatory approach that 
relies on technological features rather than rules, it then has to decide whether it 
is also happy for humans to be out of the loop. Where the technologies involve AI 
(as in anything from steering vehicles to decisions made by the tax authorities), the 
‘computer loop’ might be the only loop that there is. As Shawn Bayern and his co-
authors note, this raises an urgent question, namely: ‘do we need to define essential 
tasks of the state that must be fulfilled by human beings under all circumstances?’73 
Furthermore, once a community is asking itself such questions, it will need to clar-
ify its understanding of the relationship between humans and robots—in particular, 
whether it treats robots as having moral status, or legal personality, and the like.74
6  Conclusions
The thrust of this article is that there are many questions that lawyers might ask, 
and conversations that they might have, about smart contracts; that some questions 
are more challenging than others; that some questions are more urgent than others; 
and that there are some questions that we tend not to ask but which we should ask. 
If we are to ensure that the regulatory environment is fit for purpose (for Fintech in 
general and for smart contracts in particular), it is important to have the right people 
asking the right questions and having the right conversations in the right places.
In this spirit, I have suggested, first, that the question that preoccupies coherent-
ists (concerning the application of the law of contract to smart contracts) is neither 
as puzzling nor as important as it tends to be assumed. This is neither a key question 
nor a critical conversation.
Secondly, where we have concerns about the acceptability of smart contracts, the 
conversation that we need to have is of a regulatory-instrumentalist nature. Gener-
ally, the tilt of English law is to give commercial people plenty of room to self-
regulate (particularly through recognising standard forms and standard terms that 
are used in the trade). However, if there are public policy questions involving restric-
tions on the use of smart contracts (as might well be the case in relation to consumer 
transactions), then the appropriate balance of interests needs to be made by an insti-
tution that has both the necessary mandate and the appropriate mind-set.
Thirdly, however, there are other conversations that we currently do not have 
but which we urgently need to have. Blockchain and smart contracts might be 
72 Compare Kroll et al. (2017), pp 702–704.
73 Bayern et al. (2017), p 156.
74 See, e.g., Koops et al. (2010), and Bryson et al. (2017).
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revolutionary in various ways.75 Even if smart contracts do not touch and concern 
the most basic infrastructural conditions for human social existence, they are poten-
tially important in shaping and giving expression to a particular kind of community. 
While the mere fact that we have the technological capability should not determine 
our direction of travel,76 neither should a desired change in direction be frustrated 
by a legal framework that is no longer in line with the community’s aspirations. We 
need to have the right conversations, not only in the right places but also at the right 
time. Before we become a blockchain-using community, the smart thing to do is to 
ask whether that is what we want to be—and, if so, what kind of blockchain-using 
community we want to be.77
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